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AT THE FRONT: COMMON TRAITORS IN 
WEST GERMAN WAR FILMS OF THE 1950s 
 
 
Erst im militärischen Geheimnis kommt das Staatsgeheimnis zu sich 
selbst; da der Krieg als permanenter und totaler Zustand vorausgesetzt 
wird, läßt sich jeder beliebige Sachverhalt unter militärische 
Kategorien subsumieren: dem Feind gegenüber hat alles als 
Geheimnis und jeder Bürger als potentieller Verräter zu gelten.  
(HANS MAGNUS ENZENSBERGER) 
 
Die alten Krieger denken immer an die Kameraden, die gefallen sind, 
und meinen, ein Deserteur sei einer, der sie verraten hat.  
(LUDWIG BAUMANN) 
 
Introduction 
Margret Boveri, in the second volume of her treatise on Treason in the 20th Century, notes 
with respect to German resistance against National Socialism that the line between ethically 
justified and unethical treason is not easily drawn.
1
 She cites the case of General Hans Oster, 
deputy head of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris. Oster had repeatedly leaked military 
information to Western governments warning them of the dates of German attacks, and 
Boveri contends that his opposition to the Nazi regime came close to treason not just in what 
                                                     
1
 Margret Boveri, Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert. Für und gegen die Nation: Das 
unsichtbare Geschehen (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956), p. 56. 
  
 
she calls the ‘Hitler-Freisler’ sense.2 The underlying assumption here is that while 
jurisdiction in the Third Reich as represented by Roland Freisler (President of the 
Volksgerichtshof, or People’s Court) perpetrated injustice, some of its victims might 
nonetheless be guilty and Hans Oster might have been a real or ‘unethical traitor’. Boveri 
bases the difference between ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical treason’ on the distinction between 
treason directed against the National Socialist state (Hochverrat) and treason involving 
cooperation with the enemy, which puts the nation at risk (Landesverrat).
3
 This distinction is 
already part of Boveri’s source, namely Gerhard Ritter’s discussion of Oster. In Ritter’s 
assessment, Oster had committed treason out of moral outrage at the injustice of the Nazis’ 
war of aggression. Faced with ‘das offenkundige Verbrechen des Überfalls auf friedliche 
Nachbarvölker’,4 Oster had disregarded what Ritter calls ‘sham law’. While such behaviour 
towards the other is marked as highly ethical, in the eyes of Ritter it is still not beyond doubt: 
 
Trotzdem bleibt die Frage noch offen, ob das Mittel, das Oster gegen diese 
völkerrechtswidrigen Gewalttaten einsetzte, in jedem Sinn gerechtfertigt war. Landesverrat, 
hat man in dem bekannten Braunschweiger Remer-Prozeß geurteilt, setzt böse Absicht 
voraus, dem eigenen Lande zu schaden. Daß Oster seinem Deutschland nicht schaden, 
sondern nützen wollte, bedarf keiner Diskussion. Aber hat er nicht wissentlich der deutschen 
Wehrmacht geschadet, indem er sie in erhöhte Gefahr brachte? Ging nicht die nächste Pflicht, 
                                                     
2
 Ibid, p. 55. 
3 
For the definition of both terms see Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafrechts und des 
Strafverfahrens vom 24. April 1934 on www.documentarchiv.de. 
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 Boveri, Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert, p. 55. 
  
 
die gegen die eigenen Volksgenossen, die eigenen Kameraden, der gegen fremde Völker 
voran?
5
 
 
Boveri pursues this question further in her subsequent discussion of the resistance of the Rote 
Kapelle organization. Her focus on the distinction between those members of the group who 
cooperated with the (Soviet) enemy and those who did not provides an answer to Ritter’s 
question: resistance against National Socialism was legitimate but became unethical where it 
helped the other before the self.
6
 
                                                     
5
 Ibid., p. 55. Boveri quotes from Gerhard Ritter, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler und die deutsche 
Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954). 
6
 The Rote Kapelle served as a standard example of unethical treason at the time, based on the 
group’s presentation as part of a Soviet-organized espionage network. This view was 
publically propagated after 1945 in talks, lectures, and brochures by, for example, former 
Oberstkriegsgerichtsrat Manfred Roeder who had acted as prosecutor against the Rote 
Kapelle in 1942. Despite post-war accusations arising from his role as prosecutor at the 
Reichskriegsgericht Roeder was exonerated in 1951 by the district attorney of Lüneburg 
while his victims were confirmed as lawfully sentenced to death: ‘“Blut deutscher Soldaten” 
sei “unnütz und unschuldig durch ihre Verratshandlung geflossen”’. Roeder’s public 
defamation had, according to Heinrich Grosse, a remarkable impact: ‘Seine Aussagen und 
diffamierenden Urteile über die Männer und Frauen der Widerstandsgruppe um Hans von 
Dohnanyi und der “Roten Kapelle” wurden nicht nur von Journalisten, sondern auch von 
Historikern unkritisch übernommen. So stützt sich der bekannte Historiker Gerhard Ritter in 
seinem Werk Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung auf Roeder’s Schrift 
Die Rote Kapelle und macht sich dessen These vom Landesverrat zu eigen’. See Heinrich 
  
 
 The debate on resistance in terms of treason that Boveri echoes here was extensive in 
the early years of the Federal Republic,
7
 and it is therefore not surprising that it was also 
taken up in a number of West German war films of the so-called Militär- or Kriegsfilmwelle 
of the 1950s.
8
 These films are generally known for their apologetic and self-righteous 
attitude, for avoiding the topic of the Holocaust, ignoring the nature of the Second World 
War as a war of annihilation, romanticising it as ahistorical tragedy or fate, and cleansing the 
Wehrmacht off its involvement in National Socialism and of responsibility for the horrors of 
the war.
9
 As part of this attempt at German exculpation, the arguments for or against treason 
formed part of a strategy of safeguarding Germany against charges of war crimes and 
atrocities, as has been demonstrated in the case of screen representations of the conservative 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Grosse, ‘Ankläger von Widerstandskämpfern und Apologet des NS-Regimes nach 1945 – 
Kriegsgerichtsrat Manfred Roeder’, Kritische Justiz, 38 (2005), 36-55 (p. 55). 
7
 See Helmut Kramer, ‘Das letzte Gefecht um den “Kriegsverrat” im NS-Staat’, Kritische 
Justiz, 42 (2009), 89-96. 
8
 The term is widely used for the 224 or so international and German war films (according to 
statistics from the Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft, or Voluntary Self-
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Herbig, 1986), p. 260. 
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Bernhard Chiari, Matthias Rogg, and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: Oldenburg, 2003), pp. 
453-76 (p.461). 
  
 
military resistance.
10
 Yet the significance of the traitor figure and its discursive position goes 
beyond the restoration of blamelessness because it also opens up memories, corroded notions 
of self and political conflicts on screen. In this article, I look at screen traitors not as figures 
of self-justification but as figures of conflict that contribute to a debate on national thresholds 
and responsibilities. My claim is that what was perceived and discussed as treason facilitated 
an examination of more complex problems. 
A preoccupation with the screen elite traitor à la Stauffenberg has meant that other 
traitor figures have been ignored: my starting point, therefore, is that the figure of the elite 
traitor is intrinsically linked to another concept of alleged treason, the hitherto overlooked 
figure of the common traitor. I want to argue that these two figures are complementary in that 
they explore the two contrasting kinds of treason considered by Boveri and others, 
Hochverrat and Landesverrat. They thereby mark opposite poles between which treason is 
acted out – self and other – and gradually (re)negotiate perceptions of Germany in relation to 
its war-time others. 
Sociology defines betrayal – and treason as a kind of betrayal – as a ‘breach of trust’ 
in which ‘an overstepping of a We-boundary [is involved]’,11 or in which ‘a sense of an 
imagined community […] and of collective memories and identities [is violated]’.12 ‘Betrayal 
involves the issue of morality in the most intimate way: It touches issues of trust, loyalty, 
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 See Wolfgang Becker and Norbert Schöll, In jenen Tagen …  Wie der deutsche 
Nachkriegsfilm die Vergangenheit bewältigte (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1995), pp. 79-106. 
11
 Malin Akerstrom, Betrayal and Betrayers: The Sociology of Treachery (New Brunswick 
and London: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 2. 
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honesty, and commitment’.13 Within this broad definition, it is characteristic of the 1950s 
screen elite traitor, the Hochverräter, that although he is ‘overstepping a We-boundary’, he 
nevertheless defines and justifies this breach in relation to the national self. On the other 
hand, the common traitor of 1950s cinema is a Landesverräter; he enters into relations with 
the other, violates the ‘sense of an imagined community’ (a national community), and puts it 
at risk, while the elite traitor in fact tries to protect it. Accordingly, the elite traitor is 
presented as ethically more acceptable, indeed as a resistance fighter, while the common 
traitor embodies the allegedly unethical counter-position. My hypothesis is, however, that it 
is the figure of the common traitor that has the potential to advance and change the discourse 
on national identity by its focus on the other.  
In the early 1950s the relationship between traitor and self-community dominates the 
screen discourse on post-war morality, while the relation between traitor and other emerges 
only gradually as morally significant but then marks the potential to reverse the definition of 
ethical traitor: from being someone who commits treason in the interest of the self, the ethical 
traitor becomes someone who commits treason because of a moral responsibility towards the 
other. Thus the traitor’s transgression functions not simply as a violation of self but as a 
redirection and renewal of social and ethical values. The traitor appears as a potential 
reformer who ‘may fulfil an important social function of introducing vital change into our 
cultures – a kind of positive mutation that helps to change the moral boundaries of society’.14 
Crystal Parikh sees betrayal similarly as potentially ‘perform[ing] a cultural critique of the 
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social conditions’, as a ‘possibility for agency and transformation’,15 which becomes 
available through the self’s accountability to the other.16 
My discussion starts with a brief overview of the familiar figure of the elite traitor in 
Canaris, Des Teufels General, Der 20. Juli, and Es geschah am 20. Juli.
 17
 It then proceeds to 
the figure of the common traitor, whose features and functions are explored in detail in three 
feature films: part 2 of 08/15, Der Arzt von Stalingrad, and Unruhige Nacht.
18
 My focus is on 
the common traitor as a counter-position to the elite traitor: first with regard to his negative 
political and cultural perception as unethical, and second with regard to his potential for 
political and cultural change. These two characteristics make the common traitor a figure of 
particular ambivalence. They are rooted in his function both as gateway for the other as 
enemy and as victim of German perpetration, which turns the common traitor into a threat as 
well as into a hidden reminder of German guilt and responsibility. This becomes most visible 
in Harnack’s Unruhige Nacht, as the film tries to unlock human sympathy with the victims of 
German aggression and at the same time adheres to the strict divide between friend and 
enemy, self, and other. The first real questioning of this divide occurs on television rather 
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than in the cinema with the mini-series Am grünen Strand der Spree.
19
 My final discussion 
looks at the shift towards the acknowledgement of responsibility for the other in this early TV 
production; again the figure of the traitor helps to facilitate the change. 
West German war films of the 1950s have received extensive critical attention. While 
for a long time they were discussed in relation to strategies of West German self- 
righteousness and suppression of guilt and responsibility, they have more recently been 
acknowledged as hybrid products of national transformation in which cultural and political 
changes from the Third Reich to a new democratic West Germany gradually play out. In this 
sense, they are part of a ‘necessarily imperfect process of cultural transmission or adaptation’ 
and ‘the question then becomes: Which aspects of a discourse survive, and which are subject 
to renewal or rejection?’20 This article investigates exactly such a process of cinematic 
transmission by looking at the ‘common traitor’ as an element that disrupts the dominant 
discourse of blamelessness and points to an unresolved conflict. 
 
The Elite Traitor 
In his review of Decision before Dawn,
21
 the film that Sabine Hake identifies as having 
generated the wave of German treason-films,
22
 Paul Hühnerfeld, writing in Die Zeit, posed a 
moral question in his title: ‘Kann Verrat gut sein?’ He subsequently discussed not the 
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 Jennifer Kapzynski, ‘Armchair Warriors: Heroic Postures in the West German War Film’, 
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cinematic qualities of this 20th Century Fox production, but the conditions under which 
treason might be justified. Hühnerfeld’s argument revolved around a notion of Germany’s 
military past employed to confirm the right of disobedience for the individual soldier 
retrospectively: 
 
Das Wesen des Preußischen ist nicht gekennzeichnet durch blinden Gehorsam. [...] Das 
eigentlich Preußische ist mehrschichtig: es hat die absolute Freiheit des einzelnen nicht 
ausgeschaltet, sondern in den Dienst der Sache gestellt. Aber es muß immer schon mit 
Situationen gerechnet worden sein, in denen es gerade für das allgemeine Wohl für besser 
gehalten wurde, wieder an die Freiheit des einzelnen zu appellieren: [...] Bevor das 
Preußische und die echte Vaterlandsliebe vom Nationalismus verschluckt wurden, war es 
zwar ungewöhnlich, aber nicht unmöglich daß Soldaten, gerade weil sie Soldaten waren, 
‚Verrat‘ übten. Sie wußten noch, daß die Treue, als Tugend so hoch angeschrieben im 
soldatischen Bereich, erstens eine Treue zum Wohl des Landes, zweitens eine Treue zu sich 
selbst und erst drittens eine Treue zum Landesherrn war, der ja nach einem Ausspruch des 
größten Preußenkönigs nur Diener und Repräsentant des Landes und des einzelnen war. Sie 
wußten, daß der Landesherr überhaupt nur Treue beanspruchen könnte, wenn er die 
Bedingungen, die Friedrich II. an einen Herrscher stellte, erfüllte.
23
 
 
With this stance, Hühnerfeld echoes a wider debate in which Hochverrat was retrospectively 
rooted in the national/Prussian past, while Hitler was condemned as a ‘sham leader’ who 
could not claim loyalty. The debate was linked to the 20 July plot by high ranking 
Wehrmacht Officers around Stauffenberg. According to Douglas Peifer, a highly critical 
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evaluation of the Prussian military, including the Wehrmacht and its officer corps, had been 
encouraged by the Allies immediately after the war and had dominated the public sphere.
24
 
However, in the context of the Cold War and West German rearmament, a re-evaluation of 
the role of the Prussian military took place during which official attacks from the Allies as 
well as the Adenauer government on the role of the German military ceased and efforts were 
focused on the reappraisal of the conservative military resistance of the men and women of 
20 July.
25
 While many West Germans saw Stauffenberg and his group as base traitors,
26
 
government and Allies began to propagate an interpretation according to which ‘Stauffenberg 
and associates had been patriots who put Fatherland and honor over Führer and oath’,27 thus 
offering a narrative of a moral military tradition that the new democratic West Germany 
could resume. 
 This reassessment of the high-ranking military was reflected in West German film 
production of the 1950s dealing with the Third Reich. In films such as Canaris, Des Teufels 
General, Der 20. Juli, and Es geschah am 20. Juli the focus was on resistance among the 
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higher echelons of the Wehrmacht associated with the ‘good’ soldierly (Prussian) tradition.28  
While these films exculpate the Wehrmacht, Hake points out that the screen Canaris, Harras, 
and Stauffenberg are also ambivalent figures, negotiating the conflicting emotions of a West 
Germany undergoing a democratisation that has been forcefully initiated by the Western 
allies, particularly the Americans: 
 
In the films under discussion, post-war audiences are invited to feel empathy with the 
members of the resistance, their professional dilemmas as military officers and their personal 
struggles as men fearing discovery and arrest. However, because of their association with 
political failure and military defeat, these men cannot be portrayed as wholly sympathetic 
figures. The assumption of shared values and beliefs is reserved for the supporting characters, 
the young officers […] who are destined to become the citizens of a more democratic 
Germany. By contrast, the title characters must be eliminated as enemies: products of an 
authoritarian past and its antidemocratic traditions.
29
 
 
I agree with Hake that these screen elite traitors are hardly figures of fulfilment or renewal. 
However, the elite traitor functions as a figure of transition in that his individual failure 
exculpates the majority’s failure and yet confirms the general framework of unwavering 
loyalty to the nation repeatedly spelled out in 1950s cinema. The Prussian screen traitors 
justify the committed treason with reference to Germany and thus re-imagine a national 
community which they see threatened by a group of Nazis. 
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 For a detailed discussion of the tropes of the rearmament discourse launched by politicians 
and the press that the films then took up, see Becker and Schöll, In jenen Tagen, p. 80. 
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 Hake, Screen Nazis, p. 69. 
  
 
The problem with the figure of the elite traitor is that it has little scope for action and 
easily perishes in the face of its own patriotic maxims. For as soon as the self is in any way 
threatened by the resistance, the elite traitor loses legitimation. This is continuously reflected 
in the films, as when the sabotage of aircraft in Des Teufels General that has long been 
undermining the war effort has claimed the death of one German pilot. Immediately, those 
responsible for the sabotage call themselves ‘Mörder’.30 And only by resorting to repeated 
invocations of Germany, is Stauffenberg able to justify the assassination plan and its potential 
cost for the self to his worried adjutant in Der 20. Juli: ‘Und ich sage Ihnen, es ist zu 
verantworten – auf der einen Seite einige wenige, vielleicht auch 1 bis 2 Unschuldige, auf der 
anderen Seite Millionen. Soll man diese Millionen deshalb kaputt gehen lassen?’31 The 
dilemma of the elite traitors in these films seems indeed less their ‘authoritarian past and 
antidemocratic tradition’32 and more their fervent love of Germany which makes them 
acceptable to a post-war audience and at the same time hamstrung lest a single German 
victim invalidate the national cause. 
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 ‘In Zuckmayers Bühnen-Original stieß der Widerstandskämpfer Oderbruch auf schroffe 
Ablehnung, da er durch seine Sabotage den Tod deutscher Soldaten in Kauf nahm. Das wurde 
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 Given the focus on self-restoration, it is not surprising that in Canaris a figure like General 
Hans Oster, who informed the enemy, was left out. 
32 Hake, Screen Nazis, p. 69. 
  
 
 The apexes of the triangle of treason in these films are elite traitor, good self/German 
people, and bad self/Nazis, which leaves the elite traitor only the narrow national space to act. 
The common traitor on the other hand, who entertains relations with the other, has a wider 
scope for action albeit at the cost of the self. The national bonds and boundaries confirmed by 
the elite traitor as sacred and total – epitomized on screen in Stauffenberg’s exclamation 
when facing the firing squad, ‘Es lebe unser heiliges Deutschland!’ – are ‘expose[d] as 
particular and partial, not total’ by the common traitor’s interest in the other.33 ‘Revealing to 
another […] what had been thought to be a sacred or secret trust’,34 is particularly painful as 
it facilitates a glimpse of the others and the wider reverberation of their suffering at the hands 
of the Germans. For thus profaning the national self, the common traitor is sentenced. 
 
The Common Traitor 
The common traitors on the 1950s screen are young(er) men who often belong to the lower 
ranks of the Wehrmacht and are always stationed at the front. They entertain relations with 
the enemy and are therefore seen as Landesverräter. In contrast to their elite counterparts, 
they are never part of oppositional networks but follow individual desires, which excludes 
them from patriotic causes; the German common traitor acts only from personal motives. 
Accordingly, the common traitor does not intentionally commit treason (cooperating with the 
foreign military, for example); he is only interested in ‘human’ matters. In line with this, the 
traitors in the three films chosen – part 2 of 08/15, Der Arzt von Stalingrad, and Unruhige 
Nacht – are first of all lovers who are involved with enemy women, often Soviet women. 
 The screen figure of the common traitor takes up and confirms notions of treason 
employed by the Nazis themselves, who subsumed a broad variety of insubordinate, humane 
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or oppositional behaviour under the crime of ‘war treason’, despite the fact that no actual 
treason had been committed.
35
 In the 1950s this classification was endorsed particularly with 
reference to the danger that such behaviour allegedly caused for the other German soldiers, 
who were then idealized as ‘comrades’. Helmut Kramer further interprets the defamation of 
the ‘war traitors’ as a sign of a ‘tiefgehende Geringschätzung widerständigen Verhaltens 
einfacher Bürger überhaupt’.36 
 
Als ehrenhaft und zulässig galt damals [in the 1950s] wie heute den Rehabilitierungsgegnern 
nur der von den gesellschaftlichen Eliten geleistete Widerstand. Anerkannt wurde zunächst 
nur der militärische Widerstand des 20. Juli. Schon in den Widergutmachungsdebatten des 
Jahres 1952 ging es im Kern darum, ob jede Widerstandhandlung moralisch anerkannt und 
materiell entschädigt werden sollte oder nur solche, die in einem, im konservativen Sinne 
verstandenen ‘nationalen Interesse’ waren.37 
 
While the different types of screen traitors reflect this debate, it would still be wrong to say 
that they replicate it. The focus on ‘human’ and individual motivation minimizes the political 
threat otherwise posed by the common traitor and at the same time grants him, if not political 
approval, then at least the audience’s sympathies. Furthermore it is the common traitor who 
keeps memories of the other alive. 
 
08/15 
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The 08/15 trilogy was extremely popular with German audiences: Christian Bach calls it a 
‘gigantischen Publikumserfolg’ watched by 15 to 20 million Germans.38 In part 2 the main 
protagonists are at the Russian front in the winter of 1942, where they fight not so much the 
Soviets but the weather conditions and their new captain, Witterer, a typically cynical, 
cowardly and incapable superior. The Red Army occurs only in far-off gunfire and a brief 
tank episode. Just a handful of civilians represent the other and it is only one young woman, 
Natasha, who has real screen presence and voice. 
 Natasha is drawn to the German Lieutenant Wedelmann, yet the affair is not just 
politically impossible from the beginning but, more importantly, also de-legitimized by the 
film. This is because Wedelmann meets Natasha in a moment of serious crisis triggered by 
his superior: 
 
WEDELMANN  Wenn ich nicht mehr an den Führer glauben kann, woran soll ich mich dann 
halten? 
VON PLÖNIES  Wenn ich mal Scheiße sage, müssen Sie nicht gleich an Nationalsozialismus 
denken, Wedelmann. 
 
Wedelmann’s attraction to the other is motivated by his unsettledness within the group to 
which he belongs, which causes him to pursue individual desires. He wants to learn Russian 
and falls in love with his teacher Natasha. She falls in love with him, too, but the audience 
learns before Wedelmann that Natasha is also a soldier and is passing on information to the 
Red Army – however reluctantly – so that when the Wehrmacht wants to retreat secretly, it 
comes under Soviet fire. Wedelmann inadvertently ‘betrays’ his comrades because he, in the 
moment of crisis, forgets his national identity in favour of human identity: the information he 
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passes on is given to Natasha the lover, not the soldier. Natasha, on the other hand, knows 
where she belongs, despite a conflict of loyalty and translates the human message into 
military currency. In line with the general interpretation of the war in the 1950s films, this 
melodrama illustrates the war ‘als Schicksal, als Drama, als Tragödie, als Überwältigende 
Geschichte, die dem einzelnen Menschen unentrinnbar auferlegt wurde’.39 However, it is 
even more interesting to see to what degree this sub-plot also reveals German aggression and 
arrogance. 
The two lovers are not on an equal footing. Lieutenant Wedelmann is part of the 
occupying forces whereas Natasha belongs to those occupied and exploited by the 
Wehrmacht as forced workers. Wedelmann’s desire for this other is not just caused by crisis; 
it is at the same time rooted in the feeling of superiority of the conqueror who perceives the 
other only as a mirror of his own wishes. Yet Natasha refuses to reflect Wedelmann’s world-
view; she turns the mirror and shows him his face as seen from the Soviet point of view: 
 
NATASHA Früher hatte ich einen Samowar. 
WEDELMANN Ja, ja ich weiß schon, die Deutschen haben ihn requiriert. Sie hatten auch viele 
Tassen und Gläser, die haben die Deutschen auch requiriert. 
NATASHA Warum sagen Sie das? Ärgern Sie sich über sich selbst? 
WEDELMANN Vermutlich haben die Deutschen auch Ihre Eltern tot geschlagen. 
NATASHA So ist es. Genau so. 
 
Significantly, Wedelmann himself introduces the topic, presenting it as a cliché to ironize the 
‘bad German soldier’ as mere propaganda with which he assumes Natasha will disagree. 
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Natasha’s reaction, however, hints at the truth behind the cliché and challenges Wedelmann’s 
stance of moral integrity. 
The loss and suffering that the German invasion causes Soviet civilians also finds 
indirect expression in the discourse of war as consumerism. While Natasha lives with a little 
niece in a run-down, almost empty house, the Wehrmacht is shown to revel in luxury. A 
central part of the film revolves around Sergeant Platzek’s provision store, which is not just 
crammed with basic army provisions but also includes livestock and luxury goods, many of 
which are explicitly marked as coming from occupied territories: French cognac, French soap 
and perfume, sparkling wine from the Crimea, and caviar malossol. All the film’s principal 
characters – the ‘bad lieutenant’ Witterer, the ‘good lieutenant’ Wedelmann, the Prussian 
aristocrat and father-figure Colonel General von Plönies, and the ‘citizens in uniform’, 
Sergeant Asch, Corporal Vierbein, and Staff Corporal Kowalski – partake of this wartime 
consumerism and profit from it.  
This is also the case with regard to the other commodity circulated: women. On the 
one hand, there are the Wehrbetreuerinnen. In a carnivalesque scene they arrive like 
socialites in fur and jewels, only to reveal themselves later as salacious performers for the 
soldiers. The 08/15-song, in particular, plays on war as sexual pleasure; the camera’s focus 
on the women’s breasts and bottoms anticipates their true purpose, for after the show they are 
spoiled with sparkling wine and chocolates while they themselves are being ‘consumed’ by 
the soldiers. War is shown as a sensual feast for the lower ranks, too. At the same time, the 
defeated enemy’s women are also part of this network of consumption. When asked ‘Handeln 
Sie auch mit Russenweibern?’, Platzek identifies Natasha as ‘Sonderverpflegung’, a luxury to 
be enjoyed on special occasions. Wedelmann, who intends to ‘relish this treat’, tries to seduce 
Natasha in a similar manner to the seduction of the Wehrbetreuerinnen. Confronted by 
Natasha with evidence of German atrocities, he changes the subject and offers her a chocolate 
  
 
bar. Yet Natasha, unlike the German women, declines and offers it to her niece. This signals 
that Natasha cannot be ‘consumed’ completely, even though Wedelmann does get ‘a taste’ of 
her later on. Instead, the conflict is reinstated at the end when Wedelmann calls Natasha a spy 
and she calls him a robber. The ‘good lieutenant’ fails to present himself as harmless and 
innocent to the other. 
 The Soviet-German love affair is a frequent constellation and the soldier who enters it 
is typically deviant. He appears as weak, unstable, and egotistical; pursuing his individual 
desire he gives his comrades away but also enables the other to become briefly visible as a 
victim. This is also the case in Geza von Radvanyi’s Der Arzt von Stalingrad, a prisoner of 
war film set in a Soviet camp. The German love-traitor Dr Sellnow is depicted as passionate, 
easily enraged and thus just as unstable as Wedelmann. As in 08/15, the love affair facilitates 
the other’s voice in an initial clash in which the Soviet experience is at least hinted at by the 
woman, Dr Kasalinskaja: 
 
SELLNOW Aber diese Kranken sind auch Menschen, und glauben Sie mir, sie haben mehr 
verloren als die Gesundheit. 
KASALINSKAJA Sie haben zu reden? Sie haben halbe Russland kaputt gemacht und 
jetzt weinen Sie, weil Sie es wieder aufbauen müssen? Die arme Deutschen! Was sie alles 
verloren haben! Und wir? Millionen haben alles verloren und haben nur noch ein Bild, genau 
wie Stabsarzt Böhler. Da, da schauen Sie, der [her father] war auch Arzt genau wie Sie, der 
wollte leben genau wie Sie. Er ist verhungert, elend verhungert und Sie haben ihn verhungern 
lassen. 
 
  
 
The love affair denotes betrayal in Der Arzt von Stalingrad, too, and leads to the death of the 
traitor. Although the common traitor is again an unintentional traitor and therefore not 
officially punished, according to film logic he is still unfit to rejoin the community.  
Unlike Wedelmann, Sellnow does not commit treason by giving away military 
secrets, even accidentally. He is also not an traitor like his co-prisoner Grosse who passes the 
Soviet commander of the camp the names of mutinous POWs. Sellnow’s case rather 
illustrates that the desire for the other counts already as a crime. When the other prisoners 
identify Grosse as snitcher, they kill him brutally; the attempt of the Soviets to discover the 
murderers fails as the Germans ‘close ranks’ and are ready to be punished together rather 
than ‘betray one of their own’. This moment of closing ranks against the Soviets is presented 
as identity formative and includes all Germans except Sellnow, who is watching the decisive 
event from his Soviet lover’s window. Stabsarzt Böhler, the main protagonist and father-like 
figure, reproaches Sellnow: ‘Alle sind sie dagewesen, alle. Sie hätten sich glatt erschießen 
lassen […] Nur einer hat gefehlt, Herr Oberarzt [Sellnow].’ That Sellnow abandoned his 
comrades when they faced the Soviets is seen as treason. Consequently, Sellnow dies at the 
end of the film. Der Arzt von Stalingrad puts the message most pointedly: the individual has 
to serve the nation first and foremost without any reservation. The father-figure Stabsarzt 
Böhler sets the example. Asked by the Soviets to help a Soviet child, he replies: ‘Solange ich 
meinen Kameraden da draußen nicht helfen darf, darf ich mir auch keinen “Privatpatienten” 
leisten.’ 
 Von Radvanyi’s film employs a number of strategies to de-legitimize the Soviet other 
and present it as not entitled to German sympathy, justification or responsibility. The 
depiction of the POW camp as a German concentration camp in particular undermines any 
claim of Soviet juridical or moral right. And yet this Cold War strategy does not seem to 
sufficiently ease the (West) German conscience. The melodramatic betrayal-by-love sub-plot 
  
 
serves as a reminder of a national taboo. The traitor-plot offers a way of admitting German 
guilt and denying it at the same time by denouncing the speaker as well as the listener. It is a 
highly ambivalent construction that acknowledges what must not be acknowledged and 
denies validity to an argument which nevertheless is compulsively repeated. 
Falk Harnack’s Unruhige Nacht promised a new approach to the war and the eastern 
front and one might therefore expect a different take on the traitor as well. Noticeably, the 
film employs a different narrative strategy: instead of relegating the betrayal-by-love into a 
sub-plot, the traitor and his story are developed as a case for reflection and thought at the 
centre of the film. This narrative importance also heightens the status of Soviet civilians as 
victims of German aggression and, linked to this, represents a moral call for German 
responsibility.
40
 However, the shifting of the friend/enemy divide is kept in check by new 
strategies of de-legitimation which work to render the common traitor as unethical after all. 
 
Unruhige Nacht 
Based on the successful 1949 novella by Pastor Albrecht Goes, Unruhige Nacht tells the 
story of the love-traitor Fedor Baranowski through the eyes of a sympathetic war chaplain 
ordered to accompany the young man to his execution. The film is set during one night in 
which the chaplain visits the convict and studies his file. The story of Baranowski, who 
deserted twice to live with a Soviet woman and thereby inadvertently gave military 
information away, unfolds in flashbacks, which follow the chaplain’s reading and reflection. 
The film was expected to be an ‘Anti-Hurra-Film’ and counter ‘die notdürftig mit 
pazifistischem Farnkraut abgetarnten Uniform- und Paradefilme[ ] der deutschen 
Filmindustrie’41 of the 1950s. When it was released, at least Gunter Groll, writing in the 
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Süddeutsche Zeitung, confirmed that the film had fulfilled these expectations and called it 
‘der mutigste, der folgerichtigste, der kompromißloseste und der unbequemste von allen 
Antikriegsfilmen, die in diesen Jahren gedreht wurden’. Groll saw Unruhige Nacht as a 
warning while ‘die Donnerschnulzen Hurra [riefen]’.42 However, most critics rated the film 
as well-intended at best. Erika Müller in Die Zeit thought the film withheld most of the truth 
which the novella had tried to expose: 
 
Das menschlich so warme, anteilnehmende Berliner Publikum ertrug bei der Uraufführung 
diesen Film mit Haltung. Es antwortete mit Sympathiebekundungen für den 
Fahnenflüchtigen, die aber offensichtlich kein Politikum waren. Die Wirkung des Films ist 
stark, aber auch er enthüllt nicht alles.
43
 
 
A harsh brief slating appeared in Der Spiegel accusing the film of miscasting, a faulty script, 
and deficient direction which ‘vollzog schließlich die künstlerische Exekution der ambitiösen 
Film-Idee’.44 
 Despite the general disappointment with the film, its central problem was not 
discussed in the reviews although clearly pointed out by an early critic of the project. What 
the novella and even more so the script was reproached with in this critique was firstly the 
absence of any real conflict: 
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Beide Partner – Hitlerregime und evangelische Kirche – treten essentiell nicht in 
Erscheinung. Es handelt sich nicht um die Story eines kämpferischen Gegensatzes oder um 
die Herstellung weltanschaulicher Unterschiede. Es wird weder gekämpft noch bekannt, es 
gibt keine Entwicklung und kaum eine Schuld, – es bleibt die Aufzeichnung eines traurigen 
(durchaus nicht unruhigen) Tages aus dem Leben eines Kriegspfarrers, geschmackvoll, 
gefühlsstark, – aber auch sentimental und ein wenig kokett.45 
 
Linked to the missing conflict and the lack of development was the second criticism that 
punishment for desertion is hardly specific to the Third Reich. Consequently, the 
recommendation given in this early assessment was to introduce 
 
eine Schuld, mit der er [chaplain] später nicht fertig werden kann. Er hat – der 
Entscheidungen gibt es viele – tatsächlich versagt, er hätte kämpfen müssen, er hätte helfen 
müssen, wenn er von dem Unrecht überzeugt ist. […] Neben dem um viele Etagen tiefer und 
aufregender zu führenden Konflikt des Pfarrers sollte auch der Konflikt des Deserteurs tiefer 
und zeitgebundener geführt werden. Er müßte an einem typischen Hitler-Befehl zugrunde 
gehen, an einer von oben verfügten Unmenschlichkeit, und nicht an einem Gesetz, das auch 
für jede demokratische Armee Gültigkeit hat.
46
 
 
The obliteration of historical specificity was of course intentional, as a letter from Horst 
Budjuhn, the scriptwriter, to Günther Stapenhorst, one of the producers (of Carlton Film 
GmbH), illustrates: 
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An der Poesie lasse ich nicht rütteln. Sie bleibt das Herzstück des Films […]. Gewiss, er wäre 
in jeder Armee erschossen worden, aber in einem höheren, ethischen, vor allem christlichen 
Sinne bleibt die Erschießung Mord. Und dieser Mord wird heute wieder bejaht, wenn sich 
dieser Tage eine englische Bischofskonferenz zur Rechtfertigung des Atomkriegs bekannt 
hat. […] Wir dürfen uns nicht mehr an den Hitlerkrieg klammern, er ist schon beinahe 
historisch uninteressant geworden.
47
 
 
Budjuhn’s reasoning circumvents exactly what the anonymous critic had demanded – the 
acknowledgement of the criminal character of the Nazi war. Rather than (retrospectively) 
recognising desertion and treason as rightful acts in the Nazis’ war of annihilation, the traitor 
is confirmed as acting against the law and as therefore justly, if regrettably executed. The 
film, particularly due to its new narrative organization, highlights the traitor and allows a 
better understanding of Soviet suffering; at the same time this seems to necessitate an explicit 
and unrelenting judgment of desertion as infringement and unlawful act.
48
 
More than the other screen traitors, Fedor Baranowski facilitates glimpses of the 
wartime hardship of Soviet civilians. German plundering and murder are indicated when 
Fedor meets Lijuba while ordered to ‘organize’ provisions for the army. On his errand he sees 
emptied Russian houses; the civilians lack clothes and food (while the Wehrmacht decorate 
their offices with Russian art and craftwork). When Fedor gives Lijuba a warm winter coat 
and her little son a pair of boots, she assumes that he has stolen them from other civilians. In 
this setting, it is only Baranowski who is concerned for the other’s deprivation. This 
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sympathetic disposition seems to make him the first ‘Landesverräter turned ethical’. 
However, far from becoming a hero and new model of German post-war masculinity,
49
 
Baranowski’s increased moral and self-critical potential is more than ever branded as 
irresponsible by the film. The narrative order and the traitor’s deviance serve all the more 
strongly to deprive him of his case. 
Baranowski like all traitors is deviant, but he is the one whose deviance consists in 
immaturity. We learn of the young Fedor that he grew up out of wedlock and was raised by a 
neglectful mother; he has no trade, received no training and is generally perceived as child-
like; he is often referred to as ‘Junge’ and ‘Bengel’. That he has a Slavonic name and comes 
from East Prussia marginalizes him in the national context, particularly as the film takes 
pains to mention that, had Fedor been a legitimate child, he would have had his father’s very 
German surname Hoffmann. While this blunt metaphor of privation already lessens the 
traitor’s culpability, his potential to disturb and challenge the self is further reduced by his 
unsophistication: with Fedor the traitor figure changes in that his individual desire is 
presented as moral and deeply human, yet at the same time all intellectual competence to 
reflect on his decisions is removed. Fedor seems to act out of instinct when he ‘betrays’ the 
Wehrmacht twice to live with Lijuba. Their retreat to a hut in the woods is in the tradition of 
the idyll and its locus amoenus. There is a longing for peace and justice/égalité in this, yet its 
connotation of childishness undermines the critical stance. The arguments between the lovers 
Wedelmann/Natasha and Sellnow/Kasalinskaja give way to a total understanding between 
Fedor and Lijuba on ‘purely human’ grounds. Their simplicity and unsophistication grants 
conciliation and at the same time undermines it. Unlike Natasha or Kasalinskaja, who are 
educated, reflective and have moral controversies with their equally accomplished German 
lovers, Fedor and Lijuba only communicate about basic needs. This is echoed in their 
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language proficiency: while Natasha and Kasalinskaja spoke very good German – albeit with 
an artificially thick accent – Lijuba and Fedor stick to basic vocabulary and rudimentary 
grammar. 
 Another way of undermining the potential threat arising for a German audience from 
Baranowski’s treason is the narrative frame given to the army chaplain. It is through the latter 
that Baranowski’s story is told. Indeed, Baranowski does not appear until 20 minutes into the 
film and we don’t learn his story until another 20 minutes later. The chaplain is presented as a 
war-loathing, sympathetic character whose humanity and critical prudence offer him as the 
main character and the one for the audience to relate to – particularly in his inner conflict of 
understanding and sympathising with Baranowski and yet condemning desertion as 
Landesverrat:  
 
MASCHER Übrigens ein ordentlicher Junge. Ich habe immer gesagt: ‚Schade um den 
Bengel.‘ Aber Fahnenflucht – nee, da ist nischt zu machen. 
PFARRER Für seine Freiheit muss man schon kämpfen, bevor es Landesverrat wird. 
Auch Baranowski ist ja nicht ohne Schuld und kein englischer Kaplan käme daran vorbei 
einen Fahnenflüchtigen auf seinem letzten Weg zu begleiten. 
 
The chaplain thus gives the obedience of the German majority a kind and sensitive voice, 
particularly as he also offers common ground for national identity beyond the war: he, who 
has all the faculties that Baranowski lacks, is highly educated and sophisticated and provides 
Mozart, good wine, literature, and savoir-vivre of former times as markers of German identity 
from which Baranowski is as excluded as the ‘bad Nazi’ of the film. The chaplain’s loyalty 
seems to lie with the individual soldiers, not the regime; however, he trusts the regime’s laws, 
judgment, and files as he bases his own understanding of Baranowski on their documentation. 
  
 
 The figure of the love-traitor in these West German films follows the rhetoric of 
national self-justification linked to the denial of the other albeit based on the demonstration 
of the other’s suffering. All three films fail to recognize that the discussion of the Third Reich 
and the Second World War had to find its point of reference not in questions of national 
legality and coherence but of international law and human rights; Unruhige Nacht in 
particular illustrates the insufficiency of the national approach as it poses the question of 
justice with regard to the other but then fails to tackle them. 
 That the debate had to go beyond the national context had been stressed by 
prosecuting attorney Fritz Bauer, whose much quoted closing statement in the 1952 Remer 
trial not only rebutted the accusation of treason with regard to the 20 July plot as false, but 
also laid down the points of reference for judging guilt: 
 
Das Gesetz findet dort seine Grenzen, wo es in Widerspruch zu den allgemein anerkannten 
Regeln des Völkerrechts oder zu dem Naturrecht tritt, oder der Widerspruch des positiven 
Gesetzes zur Gerechtigkeit ein so unerträgliches Maß erreicht, daß das Gesetz als unrichtiges 
Recht der Gerechtigkeit zu weichen hat. Wird der Grundsatz der Gleichheit bei der Satzung 
des positiven Rechts überhaupt verleugnet, dann entbehrt das Gesetz der Rechtsnatur und ist 
überhaupt kein Recht.
50
 
 
While none of the films of the Kriegsfilmwelle revised their perspective, a TV production 
from 1960 did and even today Am grünen Strand der Spree comes as a shock when watched 
after the big-screen war-entertainment of the time. The mini-series takes up the relation 
between national self and its others and offers a modified, if not completely changed answer 
to the initial question: ‘Ging nicht die nächste Pflicht, die gegen die eigenen Volksgenossen, 
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die eigenen Kameraden, der gegen fremde Völker voran?’ Again, the question is re-
considered through the figure of the traitor, which borrows features of the common traitor 
discussed so far but also reflects back on the elite traitor. 
 
Am grünen Strand der Spree 
My final section focuses on the first two parts of this five-part series produced by the NWDR 
and broadcast by ARD in 1960: Das Tagebuch des Jürgen Wilms and Der General. Both 
films are set during the war in occupied Poland, parts of the Soviet Union and Norway. Even 
though only part 2, Der General, presents the figure of the traitor, both parts belong together 
in that Das Tagebuch des Jürgen Wilms – doubtlessly the most unsettling of the films – can 
be considered a preparation for the treason committed in Der General. 
 The common traitors looked at were younger soldiers at the front line/on foreign 
territory. Their treason was triggered by individual crises, which led them to pursue their own 
desires fulfilled in a love affair with the other. These relationships gave a glimpse of the 
suffering of the Soviet civilians at the hands of the Germans without, however, making this 
suffering an explicit concern; indeed its relegation into a sub-plot and the de-legitimation of 
the love-traitors reinforced a notion of German moral integrity. This changes when in Am 
grünen Strand der Spree the young German soldiers become first outsiders and then traitors 
not because they are emotionally unstable and therefore ‘fall’ for the other, but because they 
witness the other’s pain and therefore find their notion of self undermined. This cautious and 
gradual reversal of cause and effect is prepared by a closer look at the other as well as the 
filmic reworking of the soldier from a figure of action to a figure of perception. 
 As indicated in the title, Das Tagebuch des Jürgen Wilms offers an individual’s 
perspective on the war – mainly in Poland and parts of the Soviet Union. In the manner of the 
common traitor, the young Wilms is interested in the other and their language; consequently 
  
 
the perspective offered revolves around his efforts to decipher the other, to read their signs 
and lives. If such interest was seen as highly deviant in the films discussed before, it is now 
presented as open-minded and perceptive. The film re-establishes a link between language 
learning and empathising with the people and presents it as fundamentally human and beyond 
a love interest. The first decisive scene occurs when Wilms, searching a word in his Polish 
dictionary, looks up to see into the face of a Polish Jewish girl asking him for help. Just as 
Wilms remains a frequent camera eye for the audience, we also often see him watching; the 
emphasis on forms of seeing predetermines Wilms to become an eye-witness of the 
Holocaust on German screens, which culminates in a terrible, twenty-minute-long scene of 
mass murder ‘in bis dato unbekannter Offenheit’.51 
 Despite witnessing the Holocaust and understanding his own inactivity in the face of 
atrocities as cowardice and complicity, Jürgen Wilms does not desert from the Wehrmacht let 
alone join the other side.
52
 However, if one accepts that the successive mini-films have a 
progression built-in with regard to the individual’s freedom and responsibility to act, then 
Lieutenant von Sternberg’s support of the Norwegian liberation army in Der General takes 
up where Wilms left off, and draws the consequences from the atrocities which Wilms 
witnessed. 
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In line with the figures discussed, von Sternberg is a minor character whose treason 
forces the other members of the military staff to take sides. Like Baranowski and Sellnow, 
Sternberg as a Baltic German belongs to the national margins, which is further stressed by his 
interest in languages that he shares with Wilms and Wedelmann; we learn that Sternberg 
understands Estonian, German, Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian, with the latter language, 
typically, linked to a love interest, as Sternberg too has a relationship with a local woman. 
Yet emphasis is first of all put on Sternberg’s international grounding which saves him from 
getting caught in fatalistic notions of Germanness and in complicity with murder and 
injustice. While in the other films treason was seen as inexcusable if explainable 
misbehaviour, Sternberg’s treason is for the first time intentional and appears as a clear-
sighted and justified decision which is further underlined by its purely ethical rationale and 
the absence of emotional crisis and mental instability or immaturity. In the rendition of 
judgement Sternberg is quoted as having 
 
selbst betont, er halte sein Tun für gerechtfertigt. Er sei Balte und sei im guten Glauben an 
die Sendung der deutschen Kultur in die Wehrmacht eingetreten. Der Nationalsozialismus 
habe aber diesen seinen Glauben, mit dem er aufgewachsen sei, restlos erschüttert. 
 
In a number of instances Der General seems like a reversal of Unruhige Nacht which is 
particularly striking with regard to the relation between traitor and army chaplain. Sternberg 
is presented as upright and determined, which includes his rejection of Christian absolution. 
Instead of looking for comfort from a priest, he escapes prison and his death sentence. The 
nonchalance with which the chaplain in Unruhige Nacht justifies the death of the traitor, is 
ironized in Der General when judge and chaplain wonder ‘was hätt ich denn machen sollen?’ 
while the young soldier has long changed sides. 
  
 
 The main character of the film is Sternberg’s antagonist, a general. He looks on 
Sternberg as a son but immediately arrests him when catching him red-handed informing the 
Norwegians. With General Johann Beatus Freiherr von Hach und zu Malserhaiden the 
Prussian discourse so prominent in the depiction of the elite traitors is taken up again and 
revised vis-à-vis the common traitor. In line with the wider debate, the film disclaims the 
Third Reich as Prussia’s ‘true essence’ or successor: ‘Wie es denn überhaupt das Dritte Reich 
falsch deuten hieße, wenn man in ihm eine entsetzliche Sublimierung preußischen Wesens 
sehen wollte, wie das die Alliierten einst taten.’ However, Prussia is not confirmed as a 
suitable tradition either. According to the film, the Prussian ‘essence’ is not patriotism but a 
systematically cultivated death-wish linked to an obsession with constant fighting: 
 
Dabei ist es weniger ihre Kampf- und Mordlust, die abstoßend wirkt, als vielmehr eine Art 
systematisch gepflegter Todessehnsucht. Ein manerierter Kult mit der eigenen Formfestigkeit 
und Selbstbeherrschung. Es sind sozusagen die Calvinisten des Preußentums. [...] 
 
While thus Prussia is freed from blame for National Socialist crimes, it is by no means quoted 
as a role model, which is particularly important when we learn that the general is linked to the 
20 July plot. The film directly confronts treason with reference to the self and treason with 
reference to the other and in this comparison presents the Prussian elite as impotent, while the 
young internationally-rooted generation is seen as capable and is given a future. The best the 
old elite can do before seeking death in battle and thus fulfilling their ‘Prussian nature’ is to 
help the young. Atoning for the arrest of Sternberg, the general arranges for the young 
lieutenant to escape to safety and thus helps the first Landesverräter to survive if not on 
cinema than at least on TV screens. 
  
  
 
Conclusion 
The common traitor like the elite traitor holds a distinct position in the landscapes of war in 
West German film production of the 1950s. He exists in variations though central elements 
remain, as films such as Der Fuchs von Paris
53
 or Die letzte Brücke
54
 confirm: The common 
traitor is young and part of the fighting units; the treason is triggered by relations with the 
enemy though it is always unintentional; the focus is on the individual as ‘human’, which is 
seen in conflict with its national identity and political convictions; the praise of humanity 
does allow a glimpse of the political reality, however brief it may be. Thus Yvonne asks 
Captain Fürstenwerth in Der Fuchs von Paris: ‘Ach, Sie sind nicht gern Soldat? Muss doch 
Spaß machen: In Häusern wohnen, die man beschlagnahmt, Wein trinken, den man requiriert, 
sich anzueignen, was einem nicht gehört.’ 
As negotiator between self and other, the common traitor is hopelessly lost for the 
national collective as he marks the collective’s failure to engage with the atrocities committed 
in the recent past. He fulfils this function as marker of national failure not because he sets a 
positive example for dealing with guilt and responsibility but because he personifies various 
conflicts that impede such an engagement. His deviant character and behaviour have been 
discussed as metaphors for the challenge arising for the self from the lost war, the exposure 
and discussion of atrocious crimes, and the following occupation and division of the country. 
Furthermore, the common traitor can also be understood as exposing a lack of acceptable 
models for engaging with this past, as is indicated by the gender implications of the figure. In 
all the cinema films discussed, it is a woman who gives voice to at least some of the suffering 
at the hands of the Germans, never a Soviet or French man even where they play central parts 
as in Der Arzt von Stalingrad and Der Fuchs von Paris. The connotation of suffering as 
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 Der Fuchs von Paris, dir. by Paul May (Constantin Film, 1957). 
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 Die letzte Brücke, dir. by Helmut Käutner (Columbia Filmgesellschaft mbH, AU 1954). 
  
 
‘feminine’ stains the common traitor who in terms of genre tends to be a melodramatic 
character (unlike the elite traitor who is tragic). In this context it is noteworthy that the 
earliest German-speaking film dealing with the topic, Helmut Käutner’s Die Letzte Brücke, 
had a female traitor. In Käutner’s film a nurse at the front is abducted by Yugoslav partisans 
who need a doctor for their injured. Torn between her ethical obligations as a doctor and her 
national duty, she complies with her ethical responsibility and accepts to die as a national 
outcast. Käutner’s film too relegates political discussion into mise-en-scène and asides and 
focuses its narrative on ‘human’ drama. However, Käutner’s melodrama fulfils genre 
expectations by presenting a woman as the exponent of political conflict in the realm of 
emotion. In comparison, that West German war films present men in stark emotional conflict 
labelled in political terms as Landesverräter points to the emasculation that the end of the 
war brought, and marks a lack of accepted political models of action that would found a new 
masculinity in relation to the victim other. 
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